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1. The term "read-alike" defines a work that has the same look and feel as a work by
a particular author but is produced by nonhuman means. Copyright law does not
contemplate the concept of a computer-generated work that misappropriates an author's
style. I have coined the term read-alike to express this concept.
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The sun was hot. Her hair was dark. He wanted her.
Nick was excited. He could still smell the pungent odor of
bull on his clothing. He examined the spot where he had
nearly been gored. It would leave a fine scar. He took off his
boots and sat down on the iron bed in the tiny room in Pam-
plona. She came to him.
There was a ringing. It was shrill. It filled his head like
the rapid burst of cannon fire. He wanted some absinthe. He
reached for the bottle. The ringing. It wouldn't stop. He
grabbed the damn cellular phone and answered it. It was his
publisher. He had something to fax. She was still waiting on
the bed-open for him; only for him.
He moved over to the dresser. Where was the damn
glass? He put the bottle to his lips and felt the shock, then the
calm as the absinthe rolled down his throat. He turned on the
fax machine and waited.
I. INTRODUCTION
The lost writings of Hemingway? Probably not. But computer
technology is advancing rapidly to the point where a computer may
soon be able to generate works in the exact style of any author it is
programmed to duplicate. The first example of this new technology
has already been completed.
Scott French, a self-taught computer programmer, engineered his
computer to write like Jacqueline Susann.2 The result is Just This
Once,3 A Novel Written by a Computer Programmed to Think Like the
2. Steve Lohr, THE MEDIA BUSINESS: Encountering the Digital Age-An Occa-
sional Look at Computers in Everyday Life; Potboiler Springs from Computer's Loins,
N.Y. TimEs, July 2, 1993, at Al.
3. Scorr FRENCH, JUST THis ONCE (1993).
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World's Bestselling Author [Ms. Susann] As Told To Scott French.4
Mr. French utilized two of Ms. Susann's novels, Valley of the Dolls5
and Once Is Not Enough,6 to program his Macintosh IICX, aptly
named Hal.7 Thousands of rules were input into Hal's'memory to
produce the tone and plot of the book.' The result garnered surpris-
ingly generous reviews, 9 in contrast to the reviews of Ms. Susann's
books which were "unanimously unkind."'"
Current copyright law is not equipped to deal with the potential
legal ramifications of such a computer-generated work." A copyright
law professor would say, "There is no issue here. End of story. The
author did not use anything that is protected."12 This Comment ana-
lyzes what French has done, in "creating" Just This Once, against the
backdrop of existing law and attempts to construct an appropriate
model to resolve any legal conflicts.
Copyright law protects the expression of an idea, but not the idea
itself.' 3 The idea of a muscle-bound Austrian travelling backward in
time to hunt the mother of a future rebel hero, who has not been born
yet, is not protectable. The screenplay for The Terminator,'" however,
is protectable as the expression of the idea. 5 Protection extends to
works fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 6 Protection does not
extend to procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, con-
cepts, principles, or discoveries. 7 If writing style is characterized as a
system or method of operation, then it is not protectable.
But if French's computer uses Jacqueline Susann's exact literary
style to create a work of literature that could be considered a creation
of Jacqueline Susann, then common sense would seem to dictate that
something has been stolen, or at least inappropriately acquired. The
4. Id. (quoting explanatory subtitle).
5. JACQUELINE SUsANN, VALLEY OF THE DOLLS (Bernard Geis Assocs. 1966).
6. JACQUELINE SUSANN, ONCE Is NOT ENOUGH (Bantam Books 1974) (1973).
7. John Boudreau, A Romance Novel with Byte; Author Teams Up with Computer to
Write Book in Steamy Style of Jacqueline Susann, L.A. TIMs, Aug. 11, 1993, at E6; see
infra note 101 and accompanying text.
8. Boudreau, supra note 7, at E6.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See discussion infra part II.
12. Interview with Lionel S. Sobel, Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, in Los Ange-
les, Cal. (Sept. 7, 1993) (paraphrasing statement of Lionel S. Sobel).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
14. THE TERMINATOR (Hemdale 1984).
15. See infra part H.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
17. Id. § 102(b) (1988).
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word "plagiarize" comes from the Latin plagiarius, which originally
meant the stealing or kidnapping of men.18 French did not kidnap
Susann. She has been dead for over twenty years. But he did steal a
part of her soul, at least the uniquely creative part that resulted in the
sale of over 26 million books.19 If Ernest Hemingway remained an
ambulance driver and made a career out of the military, he may never
have written anything that revealed his style. Similarly, if Susann had
never created works of fiction, her style would not exist. But Heming-
way and Susann did write and both were prolific. He went on to win
the Nobel Prize and she went on to make a lot of money. Their works
are their legacy. The law affords them various kinds of protection.
If an unauthorized film version of The Sun Also Rises20 is made,
starring Kathie Lee Gifford as Brett Ashley,21 the Hemingway estate
would have a valid claim against the producers.22 Additionally, if an
unauthorized version of Valley of the Dolls23 is made, with Meryl
Streep and Ben Kingsley in the leads, the Susann estate would have a
claim.24 If a film is made with Tom Arnold as the character of Nick
Adams,' specifically with Nick Adams's unique characteristics, but
based loosely on-a combination of Hemingway's stories, the Heming-
way estate would also have a claim.26 The stories and characters are
protected. The specific words are also protected. If one of Pilar's
speeches from For Whom the Bell Tolls 7 were used in a commercial
18. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNAiRIDGED DICrIONARY 1371 (2d ed. 1983).
19. Morning Edition: Computer Software Designed to Emulate Creative Styles, (NPR
radio broadcast), Aug. 23,1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File [herein-
after Morning Edition].
20. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE SUN ALSO RISES (1926).
21. Id. (leading female character from The Sun Also Rises).
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988); see also Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 883 (1989).
23. SUSANN, supra note 5.
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 103.
25. Nick Adams is a frequently used Hemingway character. He is a rough, weathered
man who is cynical as a result of the life he lived. His unique characteristics make him
easily identifiable. See ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE NicK ADAMS STORIES (Charles
Scribner's Sons ed., 1972).
26. See infra note 69.
27. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS (Charles Scribner's Sons ed.,
1968) (1940). Pilar is an important character who carries much of the story. She gives
many monologues on her plight and place in the world, such as, "listen, guapa, I love thee
and he can have thee, I am no tortillera but a woman made for men. That is true. But now
it gives me pleasure to say thus, in the daytime, that I care for thee." Id. at 155.
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for Calvin Klein's Obsession,2 a lawsuit might similarly ensue.2 9 But
what about the writer's style? Is this a tangible aspect worthy of
protection?
To determine if a writer's style can be protected, it must first be
defined. In copyright terms, this is referred to as "dissection. '30 In
order to duplicate the style of Jacqueline Susann, Scott French
programmed thousands of computer-coded rules "suggesting how cer-
tain kinds of characters will interact with others in a given situation,
based on patterns in Ms. Susann's works."'" According to French,
"[t]he most difficult thing was trying to analyze exactly what consti-
tutes a writer's style."
32
French identified 200 idiosyncrasies in Susann's writing. These
idiosyncrasies related to language, character, and action. The 6000
rules he wrote into his computer program served to "teach" the 200
idiosyncrasies to the computer through artificial intelligence (AI).33
AI technology is used to teach computers to scan satellite maps for
missile sites, predict Saddam Hussein's military strategy, land the
space shuttle, diagnose heart diseases, and now, write a novel.34 The
purpose of AI is to teach the computer to think like a particular "ex-
pert in a given field, and make decisions as the expert would. In this
case the expert is Jacqueline Susann and the decisions made involve
the writing of a novel.
Assume that a traditional legal analysis proves French did not in-
fringe Susann's copyright. Is French off the hook? Herein lies the
dilemma. French admits using Susann's style. Not only has he used
her style, but he has outright copied it, reducing it to 6000 computer-
28. Obsession is a perfume that is frequently advertised using sexually provocative
characters.
29. See Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
30. Id. at 707. Altai enunciated the abstraction test from Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931),
Upon any work.., a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps
be no more than the most general statement of what the [work] is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstrac-
tions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the [author] could pre-
vent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is
never extended.
Alta4 Inc., 982 F.2d at 706.
31. Lohr, supra note 2, at D16.
32. Boudreau, supra note 7, at E6.
33. Morning Edition, supra note 19.
34. Id.
35. Victoria Kader, Use of "Expert Systems" Spreads, Particularly in Europe, and U.S.
Has Technological Lead, Bus. AM., Sept. 7, 1992, at 18.
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programmed rules equalling hundreds of thousands of lines of com-
puter code. The result is a computer-produced work from which
French is profiting. If copyright law vindicates French, should he be
able to continue writing books in the style of Susann or any other
author he chooses to emulate? Common sense seems to say no. If
French wants to make money as an author, he should make up his
own style, yet he admits targeting Tom Clancy's style 6 for his next
work.37
But don't most authors simply "improve" on other author's
styles? Isn't Blade Runner38 just a futuristic hard-boiled detective
story told in the-style of Raymond Chandler or Dashiell Hammett?39
The difference between what the author of the story Blade Runner
was based on did and what Scott French did is the technology.
Humans by nature will imitate. There is truly nothing new under the
sun.40 But when a computer is programmed to specifically imitate an
author's style, the human interpretive element is removed. The fun-
damental premise of this Comment is as follows: If we assume artifi-
cial intelligence has developed to the point where it can interpret an
author's style in digital terms, basing new creations on the closed uni-
verse of an imitated author's works, then something worthy of protec-
tion has been appropriated. It is the process rather than the product
that must be examined. Likewise, if an author has been injured there
should be a remedy. This remedy is a function of what has been ap-
propriated and how it can be protected.
Part II examines relevant copyright law on this issue and analyzes
the current method of determining infringement, focusing on the
Computer Associates International 'v. Altai, Inc. test.41 This analysis
applies the Altai test to Just This Once,42 by comparing French's book
to the two Susann works that French used to extract his set of com-
puter rules.
Part III explains the technology French used in order to deter-
mine what sets it apart from human interpretation. Specifically, I will
36. Tom Clancy is the author of intrigue novels such as The Hunt for Red October and
Patriot Games.
37. Morning Edition, supra note 19.
38. BLADE RUNNER (Warner Brothers 1982).
39. Raymond Chandler and Dashiell Hammett both wrote "noir" mysteries about
hard-boiled detectives. Certain aspects of their stories were duplicated in Blade Runner,
such as character narration, vigilant morality, and a, cynical approach to the world.
40. "The thing that hath been, it is that shall be; and that which is done is that which
shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun." Ecclesiastes 1:9.
41. 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
42. FRENCH, supra note 3.
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deal with the theories behind AI, in an attempt to determine if a dif-
ference exists when compared with human thought. Many theoreti-
cians believe that Al can merely respond to stimulus and react to
situations but is not capable of cognitive thought.43 If this theory is
true, then how can a computer create an original work? If a computer
cannot create an original work, then it must copy from somewhere.
Building on Part III, Part IV utilizes an understanding of AI tech-
nology to compare the protection afforded AI-created works relative
to that of human-created works. This section will provide the neces-
sary tools for comparing the two when analyzing an Al-created work
under current law. The focus is on Just This Once as a derivative
work. Other theories, such as compulsory licenses andplagiarism are
incorporated into the discussion.
The solution may lie in the laws of other countries, such as
France's Droit Moral." European countries have observed this sys-
tem for years, although it has been slow to catch on in the United
States.45 The concept behind it is sometimes difficult for publishers,
film studios, recording companies, lawyers, and other exploiters of
creative works to understand. The author of a creative work has cer-
tain rights that transcend the economic. Artists have the right not to
have their works distorted, defaced, altered, or diminished by future
authors. One should not be able to glue prosthetic arms on the Venus
de Milo, add Big Macs to The Last Supper, or allow Old Yeller 46 to
live.
Part V explains the philosophy behind such moral rights. France
supplies a model for protection based on the inalienability of an au-
thor's connection to her work. Protection for Susann's works is ex-
amined against this Droit Moral model.47 California has also adopted
certain moral rights, which will be discussed.48 I will explain the policy
43. See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligence, 70 N.C. L.
REv. 1231 (1992).
44. See infra part V.
45. The Second Circuit almost set a precedent for the domestic use of the Droit Moral
in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). ABC contracted with
the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) to show several episodes of Monty Python's
Flying Circus. ABC cut up the episodes to the point that the members of Monty Python
felt their work had been violated. The members sued ABC for violation of their rights.
The court declined to grant them a moral right in the work. Instead, the court found for
Monty Python on the grounds that Python had not granted BBC the rights to the scripts
that BBC had contracted away to ABC. Id.
46. OLD YELLER (Walt Disney Studios 1957).
47. See infra part V.
48. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 986 (West 1992).
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reasons behind such a model and suggest possible benefits that may be
obtained by fully adopting it. Part VI suggests departing from copy-
right law and deciding this issue based on the right of publicity.49
II. YOU CAN'T TEACH AN OLD DOG NEw TRICKS: WHY
CURRENT LAW IS NOT EQUIPPED FOR A NEW WORLD
Copyright law has two stated purposes. One is to encourage cre-
ativity and artistic achievement by rewarding authors and artists for
their endeavors. This reward is the grant of ownership of their
works.50 The other is to limit this ownership so as not to hinder other
artists and authors from being able to create.5 Most of the time these
goals are mutually compatible. Sometimes, however, they are not and
in these circumstances the courts must step in.
If I were to make a film about a man-eating shark, in a small New
England town, with a soundtrack playing bass tones every time the
shark approaches, a sheriff, a shark expert, a town official, and other
similarities to Jaws,5 2 a court would likely find that I had infringed the
original work. 3 My film would have the same plot, same themes,
same setting, similar characters, similar music, and same ending as a
highly successful existing film. If copyright law did not protect Jaws,
there would be little incentive for filmmakers to invest millions of dol-
lars to make films. On the other hand, if I make a film about a playful
shark who lives off the coast of Santa Monica and helps capture some
ruthless surfer pirates from Pismo Beach, have I infringed Jaws?
Current copyright law functions to encourage subtle variations on
previously existing works, even when they capitalize on the success of
their predecessors. It is better for subsequent sales as a whole, since
the public is more willing to spend money on something that is famil-
iar. Jacqueline Susann is renowned as one of the best-selling authors
of all time,54 in much the same way Steven Spielberg, director of Jaws,
is one of the most financially successful directors of all time.55 Scott
49. The right of publicity is the right to prevent the commercial use of one's name or
image. See infra part VI.
50. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992).
51. Id.
52. JAWS (Universal Pictures 1977).
53. This scenario is based on the facts of Universal City Studios v. Film Ventures Int'l,
543 F. Supp. 1134 (C.D. Cal. 1982), where the defendant's Great White proved to bear a
substantial similarity to Jaws.
54. Bookends; Lovely Me: The Life of Jacqueline Susann, TIME, Mar. 30, 1987, at 73.




French is admittedly capitalizing on Susann's fame and success, as
both he and the Susann estate agree.56 There is a difference, however,
between a film that subtly reminds the viewer of Jaws and a book that
purports to be a digital reconstruction of a dead author's style.
A. Analyzing Just This Once Based on Current Law: The
Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc. Test
The Second Circuit has distilled over 100 years of copyright in-
fringement decisions into a test that effectively enables courts to de-
termine if an infringement has occurred.57 This test seeks to answer.
two questions: (1) Has the defendant copied the plaintiff's work, and
(2) if there is copying, is the defendant's work substantially similar to
the plaintiff's work?58 Answering the substantial similarity question is
the sticky part. The court referred to its analysis of substantial similar-
ity as the "Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison" test,5 9 breaking this
second step into a separate three-prong test.
To determine if there is copying, two factors must be considered.
The first is whether or not the defendant had sufficient access to the
plaintiff's work.60 In our case, French admits using Susann's works as
the basis for Just This Once, so access is established by admission.
Ordinarily, an author would have to prove that an infringer could pos-
sibly have seen or heard the author's work. The second factor is
whether there is probative similarity between the defendant's work
and the plaintiff's work. This threshold requirement is easy to meet.
The fact that both Susann's works and French's book are romance
novels with steamy,love scenes, shallow characters, and exotic set-
tings, may be enough to establish such similarity. This is especially
true if the "inverse ratio rule" is applied.61 Using this rule, French's
admission of access allows a lesser degree of similarity to satisfy the
probative similarity factor.
The counterargument is that there is no copying because proba-
tive similarity cannot be established. Even with the inverse ratio rule,
no amount of access can substitute for at least some degree of similar-
56. Morning Edition, supra note 19.
57. See Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
58. Id. at 701 (discussing necessary components to establish infringement).
59. Id. at 706.
60. See Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1355 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
61. See Sid and Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's, 562 F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th
Cir. 1977) (stating inverse ratio rule allows abundance of accessi to substitute for lack of
similarity and vice versa).
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ity between the works.62 The argument could be made that every
trashy romance novel, the so-called potboiler,63 is probatively similar
to Jacqueline Susann's works. In fact, one of the key premises of this
Comment is that conventional "human" appropriation of style is not
protectablefr4 It is my contention, however, that since French has ad-
mitted using Susann's works as the basis for his program, then proba-
tive similarity must exist because the computer had nothing else with
which to base its product. If the computer used a plaintiff's work, no
other similarity should be required. Assuming that copying exists, we
move on to determine if the defendant's work is substantially similar
to the plaintiff's work. This is where the three-pronged test of Altai,
Inc.,65 comes into play.
1. Abstraction
The first prong of the test is abstraction.66 The goal of abstraction
is to dissect the plaintiff's work, in this case Valley of the Dolls and
Once is Not Enough, into its constituent parts and determine what is
expression and what is mere idea. At the lowest level, the entire
work, no matter how divided, would be considered original expres-
sion.67 At the highest level of abstraction, each word, considered
alone, is not original. The dissector is left with the mere title of the
work.68
In the case of a novel, the constituent parts for dissection are the
plot, characters, setting, scenes, dialogue, and themes. Susann's
novels have plots revolving around women in, or aspiring to be in, the
entertainment industry. There is generally a "rags to riches" story in-
volving the interactions of these women and the men who enter their
lives. Curiously, there is a misogynistic tone to the male characters.
The result of their interactions generally leads to drugs, exploitation,
deceit, avarice, and at least one lesbian love scene. The settings are
large American cities, with forays to exotic locales. The main charac-
ters range from aspiring actresses to magazine publishers to Broadway
62. Even though the defendant has admitted using the plaintiff's works, there must be
some degree of similarity between the original and the imitation to establish copying. Id.
63. Lohr, supra note 2 (using term "potboiler" to describe novels of this genre).
64. See infra part IV, exploring the nature of human thought contrasted to a com-
puter's processing which is missing the something that makes human creation unique. The
discussion focuses on the process, rather than a comparison of the finished product.
65. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d at 706.
66. Id. at 706-07 (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.
1930)).
67. Id. at 706 (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)).
68. Id. (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)).
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producers. These characters could arguably be highly delineated and
therefore protectable. 9
The dialogue is standard potboiler fare: sexual innuendos, veiled
threats, and romantic musings. Each scene is usually brief in length
with a minimal amount of description and exposition. Abstraction
serves to categorize the aspects of expression in Susann's works.
2. Filtration
Once these constituent elements have been identified, the next
step in the analysis is filtration.7' The goal of filtration is to separate
out the protectable expression from the unprotectable residue. Deter-
mining what is protectable is somewhat subjective.71 What is merely
the idea or what flows naturally from the idea is not protectable. For
example, a telephone book that arranges listings in alphabetical order
is not a protectable arrangement. Alphabetical listings are the most
logical and perhaps the only way to arrange a telephone book. It is
impossible to separate out this arrangement from the idea of a tele-
phone book.72
In our case, the actual words from Valley of the Dolls or Once is
Not Enough would be considered protectable expression. The selec-
tion and arrangement of chapters, scenes, settings, and dialogue get
thrown out as unprotectable, at least as individual elements.73 French
contends that his computer did not copy more than two words of
69. There are two basic standards by which characters are deemed protected. The first
is the "story being told" standard from Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930), and Warner Bros. Pictures v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), where the character
is more than "only the chessman in the game of telling the story." Id. at 950. The second
standard, recognized in Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1161, 1166-67 (C.D.
Cal. 1989), requires the character to be "highly delineated." In Stallone, the court found
that "the Rocky characters [Rocky Balboa, Adrian, Apollo Creed, Clubber Lang, and Pau-
lie] are so highly delineated that they warrant copyright protection." Id. at 1166.
Susann's books do contain characters that most likely would pass the highly delineated
test, most notably January Wayne from Once is Not Enough, but French did not copy any
of these characters directly; January is a beautiful but naive young woman with a strong
father fixation. Note, however, for later discussion, that Susann's works contain protect-
able characters under both tests.
70. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d at 707-10.
71. The courts are unanimously confused in their determination of what is protectable.
This discussion serves to illustrate the Altai analysis, which is gaining momentum as the
analysis of choice.
72. See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In Feist, a rival
publisher copied the listings from a local telephone book but sustained a charge of in-
fringement because the listings were found to be unprotectable by copyright. Id.
73. See infra part I.A.3.
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Susann's in a row.74 There may be instances of accidental duplication
of whole sentences, but probably not enough to constitute
infringement.
The story itself is also protectable. What happens to the charac-
ters in Valley of the Dolls is protectable expression of the premise,
which constitutes the idea. In much the same way, the individual
characters are protectable, as long as they carry the story.75 It would
be difficult to imagine Rocky 76 without the character of Rocky."
Other concepts of copyright law help make more of Susann's
work unprotectable. The first is the merger doctrine.7" "When there
is essentially only one way to express an idea, the idea and its expres-
sion are inseparable and copyright -is no -bar to copying that expres-
sion."79 If two characters walk into a restaurant, there are only so
many ways for them to order dinner. Although the decor, menu
items, server, and beverages, .ay all vary, the basic concept remains
the same. Otherwise, every author wishing to write a restaurant scene
would need permission from the first author to copyright it.
Somewhat related to the merger doctrine is the scenes dfaire doc-
trine. 0 A story about an infidelity is logically going to have a sex
scene. If a story takes place in World War II Germany, chances are
one of the characters -will say "Heil Hitler." '81 Jacqueline Susann is a
formula author. Most of her scenes are either difficult to separate
from the idea of the story, or they logically flow out of the scenario
she has set up. Based on the scenes 4 faire and merger doctrines,
therefore, these scenes are likely not protected or protectable.
Anything that Susann copied from works in the public domain
would also be eliminated. If the lyrics to a song, a poem, or a passage
from a public domain novel were used, they would be filtered out as
well. 2
74. Boudreau, supra note 7, at E6.
75. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954).
76. RocKy (United Artists 1976).
77. See supra note 69 for a detailed discussion of the protectability of highly delineated
characters.
78. See Alta4 Inc., 982 F.2d at 707-08.
79. Concrete Mach. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988).
80. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). In Hoehling,
the plaintiff believed the defendant infringed his copyright in a book about the Hindenburg
by making a film about the tragedy. The court found, among other things, that a film about
World War II Germany will logically contain certain scenes that are not protectable. Id. at
979.
81. Id.
82. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d at 710.
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We are left with the actual words, the story, and possibly the char-
acters. These elements are characterized as the "golden nuggets"83 of
expression. These are the elements that are protectable. The next
step is to see which of these elements appear in French's work.
3. Comparison
The third and final step is comparison. In comparing the two
works, the observer attempts to determine if the protectable "golden
nuggets" are what make the allegedly infringing work substantially
similar to the original. TWo works may appear to be identical, but if
the basis for their similarity is unprotectable, there is no infringe-
ment.84 Since Just This Once does not contain more than two words
of copied material at a time, there is no exact duplication of the text.85
If an average reader read Just This Once and Once is Not Enough
back to back, they would not notice any obvious similarities. Subtly,
however, there are many underlying similarities. Both stories contain
principal characters who are homosexual.86 The protagonists from
both books are naive and inexperienced in their dealings with the
world. This naivet6, pervades the narrative structure and gives the
two works a similar "feel." Both books leave the reader up in the air
as to the ending and include a scene where the naive main character
succumbs to the temptation of drugs. Both works also give the reader
an inside perspective on a perceived glamorous facet of life: Las
Vegas in Just This Once, and New York's high society in Once is Not
Enough.
The actual story of Just This Once is not legally, substantially sim-
ilar to either Once is Not Enough or Valley of the Dolls, although the
reader might come away from reading all three works feeling they had
read the same story three times.'
The inquiry might end here; however there is another possibility.
In the initial step-the dissection-the selection and the arrangement
of material that Ms. Susann used was deconstructed into its constitu-
ent parts and eliminated as unprotectable elements. These elements
83. Id. (explaining Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
84. Id.
85. Lohr, supra note 2, at Al.
86. See infra part IH.A.4.
87. For example, take the novels of John Grisham. The Client, The Pelican Brief, and
The Firm all involve the same basic story of an innocent protagonist running from a web of
legal intrigue, unsure as to who represents good and evil, and faced in the end, with a
moral dilemma.
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may now be reconstructed and considered anew as a whole. Thus,
infringement may be found if French used Susann's actual selection
and arrangement.,
Suppose P writes a cookbook with 1000 recipes, including several
varieties of foods. P arranges the recipes in random order and pub-
lishes the book. Another author, D, writes a book and uses the same
recipes and in exactly the same order. The only difference is that P
uses garlic in every recipe, but D does not use garlic in any recipe,
preferring oregano. If P can prove that D had access to her book, P
may be able to make a case for infringement, even though the actual
recipes are different. The fact that D picked the same 1000 recipes as
P, and arranged them in exactly the same order would be enough to
establish substantial similarity.88
French may be found to have infringed Susann's work if he dupli-
cated enough of her selection and arrangement. But there is no such
duplication of selection and arrangement of Susann's works in
French's book. Possibly, however, the computer duplicated Susann's
selection and arrangement on another level. If the particular style
French's computer used is uniquely attributable to Susann, then a case
might be made that the computer infringed by copying style. Since we
know that French admittedly used only Once is Not Enough and Val-
ley of the Dolls as the raw data to program his computer, then the
computer could not have possibly duplicated anyone else's style. The
only alternative is. that the computer actually created Once is Not
Enough on its own, independent of Susann's novels. To determine
what occurred, it is necessary to analyze the nature of AI.89
B. Current Law is Not Sufficient
The plethora of sibilants in the sentence still offended his
[Grand's] ear, but he saw no way of amending them without
using what were, to his mind, inferior synonyms. And that
'flower-strewn" which had rejoiced him when he first lit on it
now seemed unsatisfactory. How could one say the flowers
were "strewn" when presumably they had been planted along
the avenues, or else grew there naturally? On some evenings,
indeed, he looked more tired than Rieux.90
88. See supra part II.A.2.
89. See infra part III.
90. ALBERT CAmJs, THE t PLAGuE 172 (Vintage Books ed., Random House 1972)
(1947). Grand, one of the novel's characters, has been writing a story for several years. He
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Apparently French, or his computer, copied little of Susann's pro-
tected work into Just This Once. According to current copyright case
law, no infringement has taken place.91 But Susann's estate was able
to negotiate an undisclosed settlement with French.92  Although
French's out-of-court actions are not dispositive on this issue, they do
suggest that there is a valid question as to whether or not Frepch mis-
appropriated any material.
Imagine, if possible, that this is not a legal analysis. Suppose an
author has invested many years perfecting each word of his or her
great novel.93 Life experience and character are poured into creating
a delicate and exacting recipe. Every nuance is carefully planned.
Each scene is drafted and redrafted to final perfection. The novel is
published and it is a success, both critically and publicly. The author
feels vindicated; hard work and a unique creative vision have paid off.
A programmer buys the author's book and uses the most ad-
vanced flatbed-scanning technology to feed the book into the memory
of an AI computer. The AI displays a menu. The programmer, using
a mouse, chooses "Extrapolate?" or perhaps "Create New Novel?" or
simply "Update?" The hard drive whirs and minutes later the printer
begins to spit out the first pages of a new work.94 Nothing in the new
work has been "copied" from the author's original work. A step-by-
step analysis, like the one detailed in section A would prove this. No
court would assign liability to the programmer, or his or her com-
puter95 on copyright infringement grounds.
But if the human author's fans were to read both the original and
the computer product, they would not be able to tell which one was
actually created by the human author. The question to ask is whether
or not there is anything "wrong" with this. It may be more of a philo-
sophical question than a legal one. It goes to the very heart of what
intellectual property is. Operating under the assumption that tradi-
has only completed one sentence because he desires to make it perfect. This quote serves
to illustrate the great pains that are often undertaken in the writing of a book.
91. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992).
92. Lohr, supra note 2, at D16. "A computer-generated book based on the style of a
well-known author raises thorny questions of copyright infringement. Mr. Schragis
[French's agent] has held discussions with representatives of Ms. Susann's estate. 'It's
worked out,' he said. 'But I can't discuss it-that's part of our agreement.'" Id.
93. See CAMus, supra note 90 and accompanying text.
94. This scenario is based on advanced technology that is not yet available. French
admits that he spent thousands of hours "teaching" his computer how to interpret the data
he input and that he had to input several suggestions and changes before he reached his
finished product. Lohr, supra note 2, at Al, D16.
95. See infra part IV.
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tional copyright law does not sufficiently address this issue, the re-
mainder of this paper will attempt to explore other possible theories
of protection.
The human author, incensed, would scream to the press that tech-
nology has run amuck. An AI, programmed for journalistic reporting,
records-the author's words and cranks out an article extolling the au-
thor's ire. An attorney's AI, which is programmed to scan the news
for possible clients, alerts its employer or owner96 that an issue exists.
The attorney contacts the human author and offers to take the case on
a contingency basis. The computer shifts into its legal research mode
and begins looking for avenues of recovery. After discarding tradi-
tional copyright law,97 this hypothetical computer would be forced to
develop something new.
III. WHAT is ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE?
1,
Theories on AI range from the highly technical to the philosophi-
cal to the legal to the theological.98 "Ask a dozen different research-
ers the question 'What is AI?' and you get a dozen different
answers." 99 Although it is an oversimplification, AI can be broken
down into three basic categories: (1) Applied AI, where commercial
products use or are produced with the use of AI; (2) cognitive science,
where AI is used to solve questions about the nature of intelligence;
and (3) basic AI, where AI uses computer-based techniques to simu-
late intelligent behavior.10° The type of AI French used in the writing
of Just This Once is best defined as a combination of the first and third
categories, but the second must be considered in determining any pos-
sible legal issues. Is there a difference between the way French's com-
puter interpreted Susann's works and the way any human author
would try to imitate her style? This section attempts to answer that
question.
96. See infra part IV.A for a discussion of who owns the computer and its products.
97. Assume that copyright law remains unchanged in this futuristic scenario.
98. B. Chandrasekaran, What Kind of Information is Intelligence?, in IN FOUNDATIONS
OF AL: A SOURCE BOOK 14 (Derek Partridge & Yorick Wilks eds., 1990).
99. Bob Ryan, Al's'Identity Crisis, BYTE, Jan. 1991, at 239.
100. Alan Bundy, What Kind of Field is AR', in IN FOUNDATIONS OF AI: A SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 98, at 215.
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A. Artificial Intelligence as a Person
French nicknamed his computer Hal, after the self-realizing com-
puter in 2001: A Space Odyssey."' Hal was chosen because, like the
fictional computer in Arthur C. Clarke's story,"°2 French's Hal is sup-
posed to be an independent entity, capable of creating works on its
own. But it is universally admitted by scientists that AI has not
reached that stage yet.'0 3
If Hal were capable of "thinking" on its own, then perhaps
French would be off the legal hook. If Hal can think, then what Hal
has created is original. But if Hal cannot think, then Hal cannot cre-
ate an original work. It is therefore necessary to delve into the nature
of AL.
The debate as to whether or not a computer can be built that
would think for itself is an old one, going back to the seventeenth
century and the views of Descartes. 0 1 Although Descartes had no
way to predict the future of Al technology, he made a philosophical
rather than a technical determination when he said no machine would
be able to think. 0 He was delving into a question more akin to the
nature of the soul.
Legal minds will not inquire into the soul. The legal inquiry is,
"Can an AI be considered a person?" in much the same way a corpo-
ration or a natural human being is. Could an Al gain standing to as-
sert its constitutional rights? Could an AI sue or be sued? And for
purposes of our inquiry, could an AI commit copyright infringement,
or in the absence of infringement, misappropriate the work of
another?
1. What is a person?
The definition of a legal person varies with the nature of a per-
son. A person generally is one who can own property and can sue or
be sued.1°6 A corporation, as a person, has different rights than an
101. 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (United Artists 1968).
102. ARTHUR C. CLARKE, 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (London, Hutchinson, 1968).
103. Bundy, supra note 100, at 215.
104. Descartes asserted that no machine could arrange words "to reply appropriately to
everything that may be said in its presence." Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method of
Rightly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences (1637), reprinted in
THE ESSENTIAL DESCARTES 138 (Margaret D. Wilson ed., 1969).
105. Solum, supra note 43, at 1234 n.13.
106. See Stephen C. Hicks, On the Citizen and the Legal Person: Toward the Common
Ground of Jurisprudence, Social Theory, and Comparative Law as the Premise of a Future
Community, and the Role of the Self Therein, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 789 (1991).
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individual.10 7 One theory proposes that in order for an "entity" to
have legal rights, it must have intelligence and a will.10 8
Legal rights come into question when there is a dispute. If A sells
a house to B and also to C, and C records title first in a race-notice
jurisdiction, then C owns the house.10 9 B may now attempt to sue A
for fraud. But if A is an AI, what result would B's lawsuit have? If A
owns assets, then B may be able to recover monetary damages. If B
wishes to pursue criminal charges against A, then the issue is punish-
ment. If the AI is "bad," then it could be sent back for reprogram-
ming or perhaps, ultimately, shutdown-capital punishment for AIs.
Theories of punishment may apply equally to AIs and humans.
An asset-owning AI can give restitution. An AI can get its "just
deserts" through reprogramming. But what about retribution? Sup-
pose the AI is a hospital administrator. A patient fails to pay a delin-
quent bill. The AI orders the patient's respiratory system turned off,
through a computer, and the patient dies. If a prosecutor wishes to
pursue a case for murder, how can the family of the deceased feel they
have been vindicated? But compare this hypothetical to a corporate
error that results in negligently caused damages, such as the Exxon
Valdez incident. 110 There is often no theory for assigning liability and
issuing criminal punishment to the corporation. AI researchers who
wish to give greater administrative responsibility to their "creations"
may cite to the entire body of corporate law to silence those critics
who fear an Orwellian society run by soulless machines. An AI could
therefore infringe a copyright but escape payment of full restitution to
those infringed.
2. Do people really have to think?
The current state of AI technology, notwithstanding French's
Hal, is almost exclusively used in "expert systems.""' These systems
are programmed with decision rules by human experts in any given
107. See generally CAL. CORP. CODE (West 1992) (cited as source for rights of
corporation).
108. Solum, supra note 43, at 1239 (discussing JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND
SOURCES OF THE LAW (Roland Gray ed., 1921)).
109. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1214-1215 (West 1992).
110. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the
Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv., 781, 786 (1991) (stating fines and restitution will not mod-
ify Exxon's conduct).
111. As are being used as expert systems in the diagnoses of industrial processing and
control systems. They have been used in everything from the building of Volvos to the
running of banks. See Kader, supra note 35, at 18.
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field. The computers then use this set of decision rules to problem-
solve, in much the same way a lawyer uses existing case law to develop
a legal strategy. What separates AIs from ordinary computers is the
ability to apply existing knowledge to a new set of facts or prob-
lems." 2 This ability could be considered thinking.
Thinking has not been conclusively defined, either by philoso-
phers or scientists. The boundaries of consciousness are slowly being
discovered, often with the help of AIs." If a machine is merely imi-
tating human thought, but not actually thinking, then it may not qual-
ify as a person. This reasoning assumes that something is missing
from an AI, so that it cannot be a person." 4 The so-called missing-
something argument looks at souls, consciousness, intentionality, feel-
ings, interests, and free wills as candidates for what is missing." 5 This
section will analyze each one of these missing elements to determine if
one is necessary to prove that an Al has misappropriated the work of
a human.
The argument that a machine cannot have a soul, and is therefore
not a person, is too ethereal for this Comment. Although theologians
may argue the point, this discussion assumes that a soul is not a re-
quirement of personhood. Many lawyers will probably agree with this
statement. The soul is an intangible commodity. We often use the
word soul to represent those qualities which make one human truly
unique when compared to another. Writers are often said to have
"reached into their souls" when they create something truly moving.
Soul was used earlier in the discussion," 6 to represent unprotected
aspects of Susann's works that this discussion seeks to protect.
After reading six or seven law review articles in a row, the mind
of the reader, on about the 800th footnote, may slip into unconscious-
ness. In a conventional sense, consciousness is the difference between
alertness, or being awake, and loss of sense, as in sleep. Self-con-
sciousness is perhaps a higher level. An Al can certainly be program-
med to react to stimuli or to respond, even to new experiences. An
AI could conceivably be programmed to simulate consciousness.
17
112. Ryan, supra note 99, at 240.
113. Id.
114. I credit Lawrence B. Solum, supra note 43, at 1262 n.106, for this concept. Profes-
sor Solum relies on OWEN J. FLANAGAN, JR., THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND 254 (1991), as
well as John Haugeland, Semantic Engines: An Introduction to Mind Design, in MIND
DESIGN 1, 32 (John Haugeland ed., 1981).
115. Solum, supra note 43, at 1261-72.
116. See supra part I.
117. Solum, supra note 43, at 1265.
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But it is difficult to grasp how an AI could be self-aware. If an AI
were self-aware, would its life have value to itself? The fictional Hal
of 2001 became so self-aware that it took steps to protect itself. Since
AI research hasn't reached this point, this question may only be an-
swered in the abstract.
The relevant inquiry is whether self-awareness translates into the
ability to create rather than merely to reinterpret. If French's Hal is
self-aware, then it might be said to have created an original work, in
the way a human would. If it is not self-aware, however, then it
doesn't realize what it has done. The fruit of its labors is then merely
a digital reinterpretation of what it has been programmed with, and an
infringement of the underlying work.
3. I process data therefore I am
Self-awareness is a key point to this discussion. A human author
who imitates Jacqueline Susann by reading her books has committed
no actionable infringement. 118 An AI that is self-aware would con-
ceivably be no different than a "physical human person." But if the
AI were merely imitating human behavior by processing two Susann
novels into one new work, then perhaps an actionable misappropria-
tion has taken place. More information would be necessary to make a
determination." 9
It has been estimated that it would take roughly ten trillion calcu-
lations per second to equal the speed of the human brain. 20 It is be-
lieved that computers' will not reach this speed, economically, f6r
another thirty-five years.' 2' So now we know the human brain is re-
ally complicated. That does not really prove anything. What we are
looking for is the nexus between how the computer turns Susann's
books into its own and a how a human accomplishes this task. Until
modern science makes the necessary leaps in understanding, this ques-
tion may not have an answer. We must choose, even arbitrarily, to
allocate rights of ownership based on existing law and knowledge of
technology.
118. See supra part II for a detailed discussion of what constitutes conventional
infringement.
119. This information might be what other knowledge the computer contains and what
other possible sources of input were used in the production of the work in question.





4. Intentionality, feelings, interests, and free will' 22
The remaining "missing-something" elements that serve to ex-
plain the difference between the computer and the human are also
due consideration. This Comment contends that if one of these ele-
ments is necessary for personhood, and Hal is missing it, Hal has mis-
appropriated from Susann. Intentionality can best be described as
state of mind, similar to the states of mind in criminal or tort law."z ' If
an AI is not self-aware, then it is unlikely it can possess the requisite
state of mind to commit an intentional tort, for example.
a. intentionality
Without intentionality, can an AI create a unique work? Works
of fiction generally have themes and points of view. Although these
themes may not be clearly stated, they are definitely accessible to the
trained reader. A work of satire, such as Gulliver's Travels,124 uses
fictional characters and settings to represent real ones: Lilliput stands
for England, Blefuscu represents France, and Flimnam is Sir Robert
Walpole."z Swift used these characters to convey his message about
government, law, and power to the reader. Without intentionality of
thought, Swift would not have any message to convey, unless he used,
or copied, someone else's message.
Just This Once12 6 contains a unique point of view about homosex-
uality that is coincidentally contained in Susann's works as well. What
makes this view unique is its dated perspective. Susann wrote Once is
Not Enough in 1973.127 In it, the Karla character is admittedly a les-
bian. The book describes in detail her realization that she was not
interested in men and her joy at finding the sexual pleasures of wo-
men. But when she meets the "right man," she realizes that she likes
men after all and doesn't have to be a lesbian anymore."z
David... she had thought she was too old for all that. David
with the blond hair and brown eyes.., and she felt young
and foolish and wonderful when she was with David.... Be-
122. Solum, supra note 43, at 1267-74.
123. Id. at 1267 n.127.
124. A NORTON CRITICAL EDITION: JONATHAN SwrFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS (Robert
A. Greenberg ed., 2d ed. W.W. Norton & Co. 1970) (1785).
125. See A.E. Dyson, Swift. The Metamorphosis of Irony, in A NORTON CRITICAL EDI-
TION: JONATHAN SwiFr, GULLIVER'S TRAvELS 350 (Robert A. Greenberg ed., 2d ed.
W.W. Norton & Co. 1970).
126. FRENCH, supra note 3.
127. SusANN, supra note 6.
128. Id. at 244.
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cause for the first time, she had known that she wasn't really
a lesbian.... A woman's soft body after David's strong lean
one suddenly was beginning to repel her. 29
Compare this to French's character of Leon, who is gay for the
first three-fourths of the book. In the end, he surprises his old friends
with the revelation that he is engaged to a woman. Having never ex-
perienced sex with a woman, the first time miraculously converts him
into a heterosexual. "She's great Carol, you'll really like her-smart,
gorgeous. Her touch excites me, do you know what that's like? ... I
know I sound like a teenager, but it's so new to me .... "130 Although
science has recently refuted the concept that people "choose" to be
gay, 3 ' French's book maintains the same viewpoint as Susann's.
Either the computer "got" this idea from Susann, or French himself
had the same idea, in which case the computer did not actually create
the book-French did.
If an Al cannot make value judgments, such as formulating a re-
alistic view about sexuality, then perhaps something is missing. De-
termining what aspect of humanity is responsible for our viewpoints is
not an easy task.
b. nothing more than feelings
Some argue that it is our feelings, or emotions, that make us
uniquely human and able to formulate opinions.132 It would seem 9u-
perfluous to include "feelings" in an AL. Ultimately, the goal should
be to create functioning AIs without feelings, so that AIs can work
more efficiently than humans; not getting bored or tired or feeling
under appreciated.
But it is possible that such feelings are necessary for an Al to be
truly creative. In this sense, Hal has not created any new themes and
is not conveying any new messages. The themes and messages of Just
This Once are carbons of Susann's: drugs are addictive and will ruin
your life; women must please their men to be happy; Hollywood is
plastic and phony; most celebrities are on drugs; and, as mentioned
earlier, one may choose their sexuality-in the same way one would
choose a new hairstyle. It may not be physically possible for an Al to
experience emotion. Recent research indicates that emotiori may be
129. Id. at 250-51.
130. FRENCH, supra note 3, at 236.
131. William F. Allman, The Biology-Behavior Conundrum, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., July 26, 1993, at 6.
132. Solum, supra note 43, at 1269.
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an organic process, stimulated by certain chemical combinations, and
activated by messages from the brain.
33
It is important to note the difference between reality and simula-
tion. An AI may be able to simulate human emotion, or any of the
other "missing" factors, merely by being programmed to do so. What
we are looking for is actual emotion, or true self-awareness, or a bona
fide state of mind. Mere simulation should not be enough, although
from a legal standpoint, it might be.
Imagine Hal is on trial for allegedly misappropriating Susann's
works. It is a jury trial. Hal's attorney questions it, asking how it cre-
ated Just This Once. Hal explains its process in detail-how it inter-
preted Susann's works, broke them down into their constituent parts
and devised rules for them, then used these rules to "create" a new
work in the image of Susann's. 34 The other side is jubilant. There is
no human-like interpretation going on here; therefore according to
our theory the computer has "copied" Susann's style. But then Hal's
attorney asks it how it "felt" when it was writing the book. Hal de-
scribes the creative process as best it can.13- Hal is quite eloquent
telling its story. The other side cross-examines, but can find no holes
in Hal's story. The jury is moved, declares Hal to be a person, and
French laughs all the way to the bank.
Why is French so happy? He knows that Hal doesn't have any
real emotions. But if French anticipates every conceivable question
the other side will ask and "teaches" Hal the appropriate answers, the
jury will believe Hal is experiencing emotions.136 Given the current
state of technology, however, it is unlikely Hal would fool anyone. If
emotions are required in order for Hal to be a person, then Hal will
lose this battle.
133. Paul Gray, What is Love?, TIME, Feb. 15, 1993, at 47, 50.
134. Lohr, supra note 2, at Al.
135. Writers generally have a difficult time describing the creative process. Although
many have methods of organization and keep rigorous schedules, the actual process of
creating something new, where nothing existed before, is not easily articulated.
136. See Solum, supra note 43, at 1235-36 (explaining Turing Test developed by Alan M.
Turing). In the "luring test, a human blindly questions both another human and an AI at
the same time. If the machine can fool the human into believing that it too is human, then
the machine may be granted the status of a person. A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery
and Intelligence, 59 Mn, n 433, 433-34 (1950).
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c. interest and free will
Hal may also lack genuine interest and free will.1 37 Where does
an AI get interests from? Where does a person for that matter? In-
terests come from society. These interests are linked to one's upbring-
ing, religion, experiences in society, and level of education. Interests
and viewpoints are often inextricably linked. It is theoretically possi-
ble for an AI to have the same experiences as a human and develop its
own interests, but there will always be the possibility of outside con-
trol. Humans build AIs and these same builders regulate the content
of their AI's exposure. 38 It is possible that a second generation of
AIs-AI-created AIs-could be "born" as autonomous beings, in
much the same way that the child of a slave could be born free. 39
B. To Be or Not to Be
The final analysis may come down to a question of faith. There
does not seem to be a conclusive determination, at least at this stage
in technology, as to whether or not an AI rises to the level of a
person. 4°
French admits that he "collaborated" with HaL141 It was French
who broke down Susann's books into their constituent parts before he
"fed" them into Hal. 142
Two conclusions may now be made. Just This Once is not an in-
fringing work and Hal did not write it by itself as an autonomous en-
tity: a person. Congress agrees that a computer cannot be an author:
On the basis' of its investigations and society's experi-
ence with the computer, the Commission believes that there
is no reasonable basis for considering that a computer in any
way contributes authorship to a work produced through its
use.... In every case the work produced will result from the
contents of the database, the instructions indirectly provided
137. See Solum, supra note 43, at 1272.
138. Remember that French very specifically exposed Hal to only two works of Jacque-
line Susann. Hal was not autonomous in its choices of the works from which to draw. See
Lohr, supra note 2, at Al.
139. See Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated
Works, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1185, 1187 (1985).
140. Ryan, supra note 99, at 242.
141. "'The computer suggested some ideas, relationships, etc., and then we "collabo-
rated" on the remainder,' French explains." Louise Continelli, In the Spirit of the Master,
Computer Pens a Page-Turner, BUFFALO Nuws, July 23, 1993, at 7.
142. "French listed several hundred facets to [Susann's] writing style-such as mood,
dialogue, verb strength, symbolism,' imagery and sentence construction." Id.
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in the program, and the direct'discretionary intervention of a
human involved in the process.143
If French did not write the book and Hal did not write the
book-and assuming no supernatural force was involved'"-Susann
did not write it, then where should the credit go?145 This is the focus
of the next section.
IV. WHOSE lCROCHIP IS IT ANYWAY?
French does not believe Hal's technology poses any danger to the
future of human-created novels. "I had to have something to start
with. It didn't come out of the air, ' is how French responds to such
worries. 46 But in the same breath, French predicts a future where
"programmers are possibly going to be put to work more than screen-
writers .... I could do 'Rocky XXVI,' why not? The dialogue is
formula."'147
In the case of a Rocky sequel, there are provisions in traditional
copyright law to handle any legal issues. 4 But without any form of
protection, authors such as Susann may lose all financial incentive to
create 14 9 as technology advances. Why should Tom Clancy 5 ° write
new books? French will just scan them into Hal and come up with
something just as good.' Ultimately, everything would become a va-
riation of something that came before. Writers or characters might
even be combined in the "hopper" like ice cream flavors. How about
James Bond teaming up with Sherlock Holmes to save the world, or
Tom Sawyer joining Oliver Twist for a little river rafting?
143. NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, Fi-
NAL REPORT 47-57 (CCH) (Extra Ed. 1978) [hereinafter CONTU].
144. Jacqueline Susann has been dead for the last 20 years. BARBARA SEAMAN,
LOVELY ME: THE LIF OF JACQUELINE SusAN (Morrow 1987).
145. Note that in order for a colorized version of a black and white film to qualify for
copyright registration, the colorizer, a human-not a computer-must make the final se-
lection of colors from an extensive color inventory. The Copyright Office looks to see
whether or not there is sufficient human authorship to warrant copyright protection.
Copyright Registration for Colorized Versions of Black and White Motion Pictures, 52
Fed. Reg. 23,443-46 (1993) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 202); Irvin Molotsky, Colored
Movies Ruled Eligible for Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1987, at 9.
146. Morning Edition, supra note 19.
147. Id.
148. See supra part II.
149. Copyright law "affords protection to'authors as an incentive to create." Computer
Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992).
150. See supra notes 36; 19.
151. This is of course a value judgment. It will be up to the 'reader to decide if the
computer-generated product has the same literary value as the human-created work.
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These seemingly far-fetched combinations are not far away, espe-
cially with the advent of interactive technologies." 2 In order to pro-
tect the human creators of original works and provide the requisite
incentive for them to continue creating, there should be some type of
legal "tollbooth" constructed now, before this new technology has
overrun the marketplace. Determining just how and when to protect
an author's uniquely human traits, such as a writer's style, before they
are swallowed up into electronic derivatives will be a monumental
task. 53 I will not attempt to answer this inquiry here, but merely pro-
vide possible starting points.
A. Derivative Works
The thing that hath been, it is that shall be; and that which is
done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing
under the sun. 1
54
The Copyright Act 155 defines a derivative work as "a work based
upon one or more preexisting works."' 56 If Just This Once, a com-
puter-generated work, is viewed as a derivative work, 57 then it could
be covered under an expansive interpretation of copyright law. If the
premise is accepted that an AI cannot interpret in the unique way a
human can-because it is "missing something"' 5 8-then, based on a
new interpretation of the old law French has infringed Susann's right
to prepare derivative works.' 5 9 French would have to pay a licensing
fee to Susann's estate and the discussion is ended. Here we have an
especially tidy case because French has admitted that his book is
based on Susann's work.
152. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Cyberpunk, TImE, Feb. 8, 1993, at 58.
153. "Drawing the line between idea and expression is a tricky business. Judge Learned
Hand noted that 'nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.'"
Alta Inc., 982 F.2d at 704 (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119,121 (2d
Cir. 1930)).
154. Ecclesiastes 1:9.
155. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
156. Id. § 101.
157. A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which as a whole, represent an original
work of authorship, is a "derivative work." See id.
158. See supra part III.
159. See supra note 157.
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Suppose that French does the same thing with Tom Clancy's
books that he did with Susann's, but this time without admitting the
use of Clancy's books. French publishes his new novel, Just This One
Hunt for the Red Patriot.160 Clancy reads the book and realizes that
French has duplicated his style. Clancy tries to sue in federal court.
He will likely have no cause of action because under a traditional in-
fringement analysis there would be no substantial similarity.'
161
Copyright law clearly excludes "any idea, procedure, process, sys-
tem, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embod-
ied in such work.' 62 A writer's unique style falls into this category.
Further, Professor Nimmer defines authorship as "a sine qua non for
any claim of copyright ... the person claiming copyright must either
himself be the author, or he must have succeeded to the rights of the
author.,1
163
The Copyright Office has not yet made a determination as to who
should hold the copyright to Just This Once."7 The delay is caused by
uncertainty as to whether French alone deserves to be labelled as au-
thor.' 65 I will concede that Susann will likely not be credited because
Just This Once is sufficiently original.' 66 If French were to copyright
the hypothetical Just This One Hunt for the Red Patriot and Clancy
sued, under the derivative work theory, French might be asked to
prove what the computer used as its basis for writing the work. Per-
haps the computer's databases would be cross-examined to determine
if they contained anything other than Clancy's works.
The issue raised is how to find French's work to be a derivative.
It may be that programmer-authors using AI will readily admit to the
use of existing works of renowned authors because printing this ad-
160. This is a fictional composite title.
161. See supra part II.A.3.
162. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
163. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.01[A], at
5-3 (1993).
164. David Streitfeld, Book Report, WASH. PosT, Sept. 26, 1993, at X-15.
The Copyright Office is delaying registration of a new novel because it can't fig-
ure out who wrote it. Nancy Lawrence of the Literary Section Examining Divi-
sion wrote Birch Lane Press [publisher] that she wasn't sure Scott French should
be listed as "author" of the entire text of Just This Once, seeing as how it's being
promoted as computer written. "It may be that space 2 [of] your application
Form TX should limit Mr. French's authorship to 'some original text; some com-
puter-aided text,'" Lawrence wrote.
Id.
165. Id.
166. NIMmER, supra note 163, § 3.03, at 3-9 to 3-17 (1994).
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mission will sell more books. 167 French certainly has; Susann's name
is right on the cover of his book. But without this admission, it is
virtually impossible to tell that Just This Once is not merely another
author's attempt to make his mark in the romance genre by "imitat-
ing" Susann, just as Susann probably imitated others before her and as
human authors probably have imitated her since.
Even with proof of the derivative nature of Just This Once, there
must be some legal theory upon which to grant protection. My ideal
of protection for the underlying works and ensuing licensing fees paid
for AI-derivative works168 is based on a broad and unrealistic reading
of the current Copyright Act. It is likely that Congress did not intend
for computer-generated works to be protected as derivative works.
1 69
In its report on new technologies,170 Congress considered the user, in
this case French, to be the author of a computer-generated work.171
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit maintained its current narrow inter-
pretation of a derivative work in Litchfield v. Spielberg 72 In
Spielberg, the plaintiffs argued that substantial similarity was not a re-
quirement to find that an infringing work was derivative. The court
soundly rejected this argument, stating that substantial similarity was
necessary.' 73 The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act affirms
the validity of a very narrow reading.174
B. Plagiarism
Every elementary school student has this experience at least
once. They are assigned to write a report oh something very broad,
say Mexico. For a starting point, they go to the encyclopedia. There,
under "M," are forty glorious pages on Mexico. The student gets a
paper and pencil and goes to work. The text is not "copied" but
merely transcribed into the student's own words. As he or she is do-
ing it, the student feels little tinges of guilt; it seems okay, but some-
thing is bothersome.
167. See infra part IV.
168. See infra part IV.C.
169. See CONTU, supra note 143 at 47-57.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 45.
172. 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 470 U.S. 1052 (1988).
173. Id.
174. "To constitute a violation of § 106(2), the infringing work must incorporate a por-




The difference between traditional copyright law and the notion
of plagiarism is that copyright focuses on the result-the final prod-
uct. Plagiarism looks at the creative process; how the work came into
being.' 75 The hypothetical student above has not created an infringing
work, but depending on how they used the encyclopedia, they may
have plagiarized the author's work.
In a plagiarism analysis, one looks more to the morality of what
has occurred, rather than the legality. The goal is to determine if the
plagiarist has appropriated the literary property of another and passed
it off as their own.'76 There is an ancient tradition of "borrowing" the
styles, dialogue, and even storylines of others, and incorporating them
into new works. 77 Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, which was itself
based on earlier works, has been used as the basis for such modern
works as West Side Story'78 and Valley Girl.79
But usually the plagiarist toils in secrecy. The greatest fear of a
plagiarist is discovery. Contrast this to French who openly admits that
he used the works of Susann to "create" Just This Once, hardly the
actions of a plagiarist. 8 ' But admission is not necessarily absolution.
There is little legal precedent for plagiarism. The term was last
used in a case in 1946.181 There have been many unsuccessful at-
tempts to invoke the concept in such diverse frameworks as enforcing
the Lanham Trademark Act' and tort law, 3 but the concept re-
mains more theoretical than legal. Plagiarism usually results in a loss
of reputation and standing in the literary community. Given the na-
ture of French's work, it is unlikely he will suffer such a loss if accused
175. The comparison of plagiarism to copyright law is suggested by Laurie Steams,
Copy Wrong: Plagiarism, Process, Property, and the Law, 80 CAL. L. REv. 513 (1992).
176. Plagiarism is defined as appropriating part or all of the composition or ideas of
another and passing them off as the product of one's own mind. WErS's LEGAL THESAU-
Rus/DICriONARY 578 (1985).
177. See ART THROUGH THE AGES 5 (Horst de la Croix & Richard G. Tansey eds., 7th
ed. 1980).
178. WEST SIDE STORY (United Artists 1961) (boy falls in love with girl from rival street
gang).
179. VALLEY GIRL (Atlantic Releasing 1983) (streetwise punk rocker falls in love with
San Fernando Valley suburbanite).
180. Steams, supra note 175, at 518.
181. Dieckhaus v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 54 F. Supp. 425, 427 (E.D. Mo.
1944), rev'd, 153 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1945), and cert. denied, 329 U.S. 716 (1946).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1988) (enforced in International Order of Job's Daughters v.
Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981)).
183. See Steams, supra note 175, at 523 (citing Italiani v. MGM, 45 Cal. App. 2d 464,
465, 114 P.2d 370, 372 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941) where plagiarism was defined as tort involving
"'an intangible incorporeal right.' ").
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of plagiarism. It is more likely that he will be despised by authors who
toil in anonymity to create their works of art; an effect that will have
little impact on his profit margin.
It is conceivable, however, that plagiarism could be worked into
the legal protection framework. One such theory, often repeated in
law review articles, uses a contract law analogy.184 There is an implied
contract between the original author and the plagiarist. If the plagia-
rist receives financial gain without properly compensating the author,
then the plagiarist may be pursued in an action for unjust enrichment.
This theory appeals to a sense of fairness. It also allows judges more
liberty in allowing recovery.
If the Susann estate were to sue French under this theory, the
court would have to analyze the market, the works, and the processes.
It is likely both sides would call expert witnesses on such subjects as
AI and literary endeavors. It is not difficult to imagine Norman
Mailer1 85 on the stand, explaining what is uniquely human about the
creative process. In the end, the judge will have to decide how French
can compensate the Susann estate.
18 6
C. Compensation: Compulsory Licenses
If I want to record the latest Counting Crows" 7 song with an all-
kazoo band, there is nothing Counting Crows can do to stop me, as
long as I obtain the appropriate compulsory license from the song's
publisher. 88 Similar provisions exist for cable, 89 satellite,90 and pub-
lic'91 television.
The philosophy behind such license fees is to allow the public ac-
cess to works, such as songs, while still compensating the creators. In
184. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Resti-
tutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 164 (1992); Steams, supra note 175, at 519.
185. Norman Mailer is a Pulitzer Prize winning author of novels espousing sharp views
on American society. Some of his better known works are The Naked and the Dead
(1948), An American Dream (1966), and The Executioner's Song (1979; Pulitzer).
186. There are of course side issues, such as the First Amendment's freedom of expres-
sion. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (newspaper not liable
for statements made in ads supporting civil rights movement). Such issues are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
187. The Counting Crows are a contemporary, alternative rock band that has recently
achieved commercial success.
188. Note that Counting Crows may consider this an infringement of their moral rights,
but currently they would have no legal cause of action. See infra part V.
189. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c), (d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
190. Id. §§ 111(a)(4), 119.
191. Id, § 118.
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this way, the music publishers cannot monopolize the industry and de-
cide who may record what songs.192
Congress has recently recognized emerging technologies with
new forms of compulsory licenses. As a result of the Digital Audio
Home Recording Act of 1992,13 manufacturers of digital audio tape
machines (DATs), as well as the manufacturers of the blank tapes
used in them, must pay compulsory license fees to the recording in-
du'stry. If Congress can legislate to compensate record manufacturers
for recordings copied onto DATs, then it seems logical that such a
scheme could be employed in AI technology.
The scheme I propose would require that the AI programmer
(French) admit whose author's Works were used to program the Al. 94
Any author's works could be utilized, provided the proper licensing
fees are paid. Using the current compulsory license rate of $.0625 per
recording for records, I would propose a compulsory license rate of
$.50 per hardcover book and $.25 per paperback. This seems reason-
able given that presumably more work goes into a book than a song
and that hardcover books usually cost quite a bit more than compact
discs. Paperbacks cost less but generally sell more copies, so a quarter
per copy seems fair. This scheme would likely allow publishers to
maintain their profit margins without passing along a prohibitive price
increase to consumers.
In this scheme, the new work's programmer-author would be able
to exploit the resulting work indefinitely. The programmer could use
the original author's name on the cover, or on every page if so desired,
so long as it is clear to the reader that the new work is the product of
an AL.
The benefits of this proposal are several. The courts would be
freed from costly litigation brought by angry authors. Judges would
be relieved from having to consider weighty issues, such as the nature
of a soul, or what consciousness is.' 95 Studio executives and publish-
192. Compulsory licenses date to the days of player pianos. Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music
Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912). Congress initially acted to restrain the Aeolian
Company from acquiring a monopoly by buying up several popular composers' rights. Re-
cording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
193. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (Supp. V 1993). The Act created legislation to compensate
the recording industry for loss in prerecorded sales anticipated from the introduction of
DAT technology in the market. Id. § 1006.
194. To be most effective, this scheme would require accompanying legislation making it
illegal for a human to falsely claim authorship in a work which is AI created.
195. Judges may still have to consider these issues when AIs begin assuming positions of
legal authority, such as trustees. See Solum, supra note 43, at 1243.
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ers would never again be able to lament over how difficult it is to find
a good writer. Most importantly, the incentive to create would be pre-
served. If computer-generated works are based on an author's novels,
that author profits.
Problems could arise where AI programmers do not admit to ap-
propriating the works of other, authors. It is possible, however, that
practical considerations could prevent such problems from occurring.
If I were to use a computer to create a "new" novel by Hemingway, I
would want everyone to know that it is supposed to be a Hemingway
novel. Fifty cents is a bargain to pay for all the free publicity and
interest Hemingway's name would generate. I suspect that French
had this concept in mind when he publicized the use of Jacqueline
Susann's works. This concept bears many similarities to the legal doc-
trine of right of publicity.'
9 6
The compulsory license scheme works well if authors are happy
to have their works adapted and re-adapted. But some authors may
not want computer-generated new "models" of their old works to be
produced. They may have interests other than the pursuit of the al-
mighty dollar. How will these authors be compensated for their per-
ceived loss? Currently, if Counting Crows object to my all-kazoo
version of Round Here,197 the group may say nothing. The issue of
whether or not an author should be able to regulate what is done with
the integrity of their work is an issue of moral rights.
V. WHAT ABOUT MoRALiTY?
A work of art is a universe unto itself. The author, who creates it,
becomes its god. The author establishes a link to the work, which
transcends legal ownership. To take an author's rights to the work
she' 98 has created may be considered an alienation of her personality:
An individual's disposition of himself is an affront to "Hu-
manity in his own person." It is violative of the "Right of
'Humanity" .... The alienation of the person, the treatment
of oneself or another as a thing, is a denigration of what it
196. See infra part VI.
197. COUNTING CROWS, Round Here, on AuGusT AND EVERYTHINc AFrER (Geffen
Records, Inc. 1993).
198. This section considers the uniquely human connection between an author and her
work, attempting to devise a scheme to protect it. This connection is best illustrated with




means to be human, not only for the individual concerned,
but for humanity as a whole. 99
The Concept embodied in Moral Rights, or the Droit Moral,2 ° is
that when an artist creates a work of art, she injects her personality
into that creation. She becomes a part of the creation. Her moral
rights in the work reflect the inalienability of her own being.201 The
concept that certain aspects of a work of art are inalienable is some-
what foreign to United States copyright law.
A. How Moral Is the United States?
Currently, the creator of a literary work, for example, only has
one inalienable right, the right to terminate a transfer of copyright
after thirty-five years.202 Visual artists, however, have recently been
granted certain rights in original drawings, prints, sculptures, and
signed photographs.20 3 The list of included works is fairly limited, and
the scope of protection is even more limited,204 but it does represent
an effort by Congress to recognize the importance of attribution and
integrity. States, such as California, have enacted similar legisla-
tion,20 5 but most of these local statutes are preempted by federal law.
Although it is limited, The Visual Rights Act of 1990 does represent a
changing tide in the United States position on moral rights, with a
view toward recognizing a link between the creator and her work.
In 1989 the United States became a signatory to the Berne Con-
vention.206 Although the Berne Convention contains provisions for
moral rights, the United States opted not to make Berne a self-execut-
ing treaty.2 7 Certain minor changes in United States law had to be
made to comply with Berne's minimum standards,20  but these
changes specifically left out moral rights. The philosophy behind in-
199. Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author
Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUrGERS LJ. 347, 360 n.48 (quoting IMMAquEL
KAr, Ti PHILosoPHY oF LAW 99 (W. Hastie trans., 1887)).
200. Loi du 11 mars 1957 sur la propriete lifteraire et artistique, 1957 JOURNAL OFFICIEL
DE LA RA PBLIQu FRANCAiSE [J.O.] 2733, 1957 RECUEIL DALLOZ LEGISLATION [D.L.]
102, arts. 26-28, translated and reprinted 'in UNESco, France, 1 CopYRIrr LAWS AND
TREATrs oF Tm WoRLD France: Item 1, 1 (1990 Supp.) [hereinafter French Law].
201. d.
202. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
203. The Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. V 1993).
204. Id.
205. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1993).
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tellectual property law in the United States is based on a utilitarian
theory209 that is conceptually opposed to moral rights. This may ex-
plain why the United States has been slow to adopt moral rights.
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to enact
copyright laws with a view toward the public good: "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries. ' 210 The Lockean view, which the framers of the Con-
stitution similarly adopted,211 gives an author a property right in her
work based on the labor she has exerted to produce it.212 There is
little difference between this and the property right a carpenter earns
in a table she has built with materials she purchased. In this view, the
marketplace dictates the value of the work, but there is no considera-
tion of such nonmonetary factors as prestige or the act of creating for
its own intrinsic value.
213
The government grants economic rights in a copyright. It can be
argued that the government has no obligation to provide any form of
protection for a literary work, but if it so chooses, may do so in any
way consistent with its own laws. In this sense, the Copyright Act is
sufficient in that it is compatible with the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court has determined that the purpose of the Copyright
Act is to provide economic incentives for artists to create, while at the
same time making their creations accessible to as many people as pos-
sible for the lowest possible price. This view sees copyright as a privi-
lege, not an entitlement.21 4 If this argument is utilized to its full
potential, a scheme based entirely on compulsory licenses2 15 would
seem more effective than the current system, based on the grant of
exclusive property rights.21 6 Granting a compulsory license, however,
would not give an author a choice in deciding how her book will be
209. See Netanel, supra note 199, at 365 n.75.
210. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
211. Id.
212. Netanel, supra note 199, at 365 n.75.
213. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTo THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 754 (Roy H. Cambell & Andrew S. Skinner eds., 1976).
214. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). This
case, nicknamed the "Betamax Case," determined that home viewers were not infringing
copyrights in broadcast programs when taping shows for time-shifting. The Court consid-
ered the utility of time-shifting and the potential economic effects, but not the desires of
the shows' producers.
215. See supra part IV.




used. As long as the appropriate fee is paid, the book may be used for
anything, whether it be for a screenplay or an ad campaign for
laxatives.
But current copyright law does limit the use, by others, of an au-
thor's expression. In a sense, this is a moral right. If the Susann estate
chooses to not have any of Susann's books turned into screenplays, it
may so limit her works.217 Similarly, if it chooses to allow laxative
commercials based on her work, it may do so contractually. 218 The
notion of an author's right to control the dissemination of her product,
rather then letting the marketplace do so, is not totally foreign to
United States law.
B. How Moral Are the French?
French law is the best model to explain a workable system of
moral rights. French copyright law makes a distinction between the
economic rights in a work and the moral rights in the same work.219
Moral rights last forever and cannot be rescinded, or obtained by any
other means.220 Moreover, moral rights can influence economic
rights. If an author licenses her novel for a dramatic film to a studio
and includes certain limitations in the contract, the studio must abide
by these limitations. If the studio does not, the author may revoke the
license." Under French law, it is never possible to fully acquire the
works of another - There are four rights in the French doctrine of
moral rights:92 (1) the right of disclosure; (2) the right of withdrawal;
(3) the right of attribution; and (4) the right of integrity.
217. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
218. See id
219. French Law, supra note 200, at 1, art. 1.
220. Id. at art. 6.
221. Id. Note that United States courts have specifically declined to recognize any such
right, with the possible exception of breach of contract. In Gilliam v. American Broadcast-
ing Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), the members of Monty Python sued ABC for violating
their rights in their scripts by broadcasting edited episodes of their show, Monty Python's
Flying Circus. The court refused to recognize any such rights, but instead found for Python
on a contract theory; when the BBC (the original broadcaster of the show) bought the
rights in the scripts, Python had the exclusive right to prepare derivative works. Therefore,
ABC's edited versions were unauthorized derivative works and in violation of Python's
rights. Id.; see also supra note 44.
222. French Law, supra note 200 and accompanying text.
223. Id at 1-3, 5, arts. 1, 6, 19, 32.
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1. The right of disclosure
An author is allowed the exclusive right to determine whether or
not to create a work, when the work has been completed, and when
the work should be disclosed to the public.2 4 This right includes com-
missioned works, even when they are in the possession of a transferee.
If Susann decided not to publish Valley of the Dolls, after turning over
a final draft to her publisher, under French law, she would have the
right to withdraw the manuscript, although she may be liable for
breach of contract damages. 22 Before completion, the work does not
exist independent from the author.
2. The right of withdrawal
This is perhaps the strongest of all moral rights. The author may
withdraw her work from publication, after it has been published, or
require the publisher to make certain modifications after publication.
The transferee, however, must be indemnified in advance of the au-
thor's use of this right.26 This allows the author to exert creative con-
trol over her works, long after she has "relinquished" them to the
public.
It seems logical to assume that this right would apply to deriva-
tive works. The right of withdrawal should allow Susann's estate to
withdraw the use of any of Susann's works in the creation of any new
works, including computer-generated works. Due to the many restric-
tions on exercising this right, however, it is seldom used, so the basis
for comparison in case law is slim.2
27
3. The right of attribution
An, author has the right to credit for the work she performs.
Under the right of attribution, she may ask to be credited in name for
work created, or to not be credited if she so desires.228 This is key to
our discussion. If Susann's estate determines it would prefer not to
have her name connected with French's book, under the right of attri-
bution, the estate would be able to do so. Without the use of the
224. Id. at 3, art. 19.
225. Netanel, supra note 199, at 385.
226. Russell DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists'
Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1, 23 (1980).
227. Id. at 24.
228. French Law, supra note 200, at 1, art. 6.
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name, programmers of As may have no incentive to use other au-
thors' works to create new ones. 229
An author also has the right to prevent her work from being
credited to someone else.230 This aspect might give some relief to au-
thors not wishing to have their works converted into "read-alike"
works by AIs. In order for an author to exert this right, however, she
must first prove that the AI's work is based on her own. If the AI's
programmer properly credits the author of the underlying works, then
the author may be precluded from exercising this right, but such cred-
iting may invoke the author's right of withdrawal.
4. The right of integrity
This right entails something very intangible and seemingly foreign
to United States law: the author's reputation. To understand this
right, one must first accept the premise that there are some things
which are more important to an author than monetary gains. This
right entitles an author to stop the presentation of her work in a way
that is harmful to her reputation, or opposed to any of the following:
her personal style, or her literary, artistic or scientific ideals.231
Although a license may be granted to exploit a given work, or
prepare a derivative work based on it, the grantee is restricted by the
right of integrity from harming the author's reputation. If Steinbeck's
estate should object to an animated Of Mice and Men,"3 in which the
part of Lenny is portrayed by Stimpy, 23 3 under current copyright law
whoever owned the film rights to the book could exploit it in any way
consistent with their contract. Under the right of integrity,
Steinbeck's estate could step in and halt production, regardless of
what was included in the contract.
Under this theory, Susann's estate might say that calling Just This
Once "a computer-generated novel in the image of Jacqueline
Susann" is a trivialization of Susann's unique talents and abilities.
234
To say that a computer can turn out a work of fiction that attains the
229. See supra part IV.
230. French Law, supra note 200, at 1, art. 6.
231. Id. at 5, art. 32.
232. JOHN STEINBECK, OF MICE AND MEN (1937).
233. Stimpy is a large "galootish" animated character in the animated series Ren and
Stimpy (Nickelodeon Network television broadcast, July 29, 1994). Stimpy constantly gets
into misadventures, has a sarcastic wit, and is vulgar and crass-not exactly in the image of
the heartwarming and misunderstood Lenny from Of Mice and Men.
234. But the estate's lawyers would have to stand up in court and make a straight-faced
argument that Susann's reputation has been damaged by French's work.
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same quality of a human author would be like saying that a chimpan-
zee can paint in the style of Jackson Pollack.3 5 Although some may
agree that a chimp's work is qualitatively no different than Pollack's,
Pollack's reputation would be harmed if a chimp-created painting
were passed off as being in Pollack's "style."
The right of integrity becomes even more important when AIs
are employed to write sequels. A publisher might have a legitimate
license to prepare derivative works. An AI might prepare a sequel
that is wholly inappropriate to the original author. The author might
have religious or political convictions that are usurped in the sequel.
Similarly, the author may feel strongly about the direction a given
character should take. Currently, such concerns are dealt with con-
tractually. The more successful a writer is, the more these concerns
may be expressed in her contract.
Therefore, the right of integrity exists in the United States, at
least with respect to licensing, but it is limited to the most successful
writers. Perhaps less successful writers could launch an Equal Protec-
tion Clause challenge against the federal government, saying that this
limited availability right of integrity, available only to those with the
power to negotiate for it, unduly burdens their right to express them-
selves under the First and Fourteenth Amendments3
6
C. Further Restrictions on Alienability Under the French Model
The French include other rights that are more closely tied to the
economic interests of the author than her moral rights, but which al-
low the author more powers of restriction after a work has been trans-
ferred.237 The transferee has certain statutory obligations to exploit
the author's work once the transfer is made.3 81, This right is not only
tied to the author's desire to see her profitability maximized, but also
the desire to see that her message is conveyed. The recent film Schin-
dler's List" 9 effectively demonstrates when conveying a message is
important. The film ends with a shot of the actual survivors of World
War II, portrayed in the film by actors, being escorted past Schindler's
grave. This scene conveys an important message about the legacy of
235. Jackson Pollack (1912-1956) was an American pioneer of abstract expressionism.
He developed a unique technique of vigorously dripping paint on large canvases, often
described as "action painting."
236. This issue would make an excellent topic for another law review article.
237. See French Law, supra note 200, at 7, art. 40.
238. Id. at 5, 8, 9, arts. 31, 48, 57.
239. SCHNDLER'S LIST (Universal Pictures 1993).
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these people and how important it is that they survived. If the studio
decided to cut this scene, perhaps to allow for more screenings per
day, the film's "author" might restrict the studio by invoking his right
to have his message conveyed. The United States, however, does not
recognize authors of films and such fights are only gained contractu-
ally by the director who obtains rights over the "final cut."
Transfers themselves, under French law, are also severely re-
stricted. Even if an author desires to give broad powers to the trans-
feree, the author may later invalidate these powers. French courts will
give the most literal interpretation to any transfer.24 For example,
suppose that an author transfers her works to a publishing company.
She would then be able to restrict the company from producing AI-
created derivatives, unless such a right were explicitly given by con-
tract. Even then, the author could assert other moral rights to restrict
publication of the AI work if she felt it violated her integrity.241
Transfers may also not be transferred. Susann's publisher would
not be able to authorize French's work. Additionally, an author may
not transfer the rights to future works in advance of completion, or
rather, such a transfer is voidable.242 If the AI-created work is consid-
ered a work produced in part by the original author, based on the
theory that the Al is "missing something,"'243 and Susann's style fills
the missing element, then Just This Once might be labelled a future
work of Susann's and would not be publishable by French.
D. Why Should the United States Adopt Moral Rights?
It is difficult to explain the importance of moral rights to an econ-
omist, or even a lawyer for that matter. There is no "bottom line" that
moral rights help to attain. Codifying a moral rights doctrine does not
help establish a more cohesive legal system or resolve any pressing
legal disputes. There does not even seem to be a huge outcry from the
arts community to establish moral rights.
But artistic endeavors serve other purposes that are not easily
expressed in our society's traditional terms. Authors often create be-
cause they wish to educate their audience, or because they want to
express an emotion that is significant to them, or because they merely
desire to add something to the world that will be aesthetically pleasing
to those who view it. These goals are linked to personal expression,
240. Netanel, supra note 199, at 390.
241. French Law, supra note 200, at 7, art. 40.
242. Id.
243. See supra part III.A.
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which is a fundamental human need. Linked to this need is the impor-
tance of being understood by one's audience, and linked to under-
standing is the ability to control one's expression.
Unfortunately, however, artists do not live in a vacuum. They
must eat and pay rent and provide clothing for their children in the
same way that nonartists do. Many artists also find that they must
devote their lives to their art in order to fulfill their artistic goals. This
leaves no time to pursue a middle-level management position in some
marketing firm so they can earn a living. Instead, the artist must
choose. If she decides to try for monetary gain from her art, inevita-
bly she will have to decide whether to conform to the marketplace or
starve. There are those rare grants, but even the administrators of
grants engage in censorship and attempt to impose their will on the
artist.244
Altering one's art to make it more saleable can be trivial or dev-
astating. A screenwriter who rewrites a minor scene in order to con-
form to a casting choice by the studio may not bat an eye, but if the
writer were asked to "add more sex and violence" to her script, she
may not have the same feeling. There are examples of art which are
highly commercial, or marketable, such as anything by Andy
Warhol,245 and conversely works that enjoy commercial success de-
spite their seemingly limited appeal, such as the photographs of Rob-
ert Mapplethorpe.4 6 If the artist's work is marketable as produced,
then she is "lucky." But if the artist must alter her work to sell it, she
must choose.
The issue is to determine who should be able to make this choice.
If an author is lucky enough to sell her work, she may be asked to
sacrifice her artistic integrity, at the whims of the purchaser. She may
relinquish the ability to express her message, or at least to have it
understood by the viewer. A system of moral rights would allow the
author to make her own choice. The market will still dictate what will
succeed. The economist may, rebut by saying that if the author's
works are that great, she will be able to negotiate for moral rights
244. Marilyn Yaquinto, Arts Official Backs Restriction on Grants, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19,
1992, at A13.
245. Andy Warhol (1927-1987) was one of the founders of the pop art movement,
known for capturing cultural icons on canvas and film. These icons included soup cans,
Marilyn Monroe, and the Empire State Building.
246. Robert Mapplethorpe (1946-1989) was a photographer and sculptor who presented
a wide range of subject matter in an objective style. He became newsworthy after death,
when a National Endowment for the Arts-supported showing of his work was criticised for
portraying graphic sexual images.
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contractually. Otherwise she must accept whatever terms the pur-
chaser is willing to give. This argument fails for two reasons. Success
in the marketplace is not always linked to merit. Often a mediocre
writer with the right connections will succeed where a great writer
who knows no one will fail. What this means is that the mediocre
writer will be able to dictate her own terms and the great writer will
be forced to compromise to make the sale. In the end, the great
writer may have succeeded if her work were left intact, but she is
never given that chance., If her work i's not marketable in any case, no
sale will be made.
But once an, author sells her work, moral rights would put the
choice back in her hands. If she is willing to make the changes re-
quested, or allow them to. be made, she may do so. If not, then the
sale is rescinded and the work becomes hers once again. Letting the
marketplace dictate also fails because often the writer cannot possibly
be allowed to make a decision as to the uses of her works. This is our
case. Jacqueline Susann could not possibly have conceived of a com-
puter that would write in her style. Although she likely still would
have allowed her works to be published. knowing this, it should be her
decision to make. Allowing an author to retain sovereignty over her
expression is a grant of freedom. It does not restrict the free flow of
information, but rather grants her the exclusive right to control the
exploitation of her works.
VI. WHAT'S IN A NAME?
French chose to use Jacqueline Susann's works because he liked
them, and probably also because Susann's name is a household word.
The fact that Susann has been dead for twenty years and that she was
one of the best-selling authors of all time made her one of the most
marketable choices for an Al-created "read-alike" work. If we reject
copyright law as a means to protect Susann's works and similarly re-
fuse to adopt a moral rights scheme, there may still be hope for an
author if she does not wish to have her name tied to an AI-created
work. A celebrity such as Susann has a right of publicity.
The right of publicity is "the right to prevent others from using
one's name or picture for commercial purposes without consent," 247
or "the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial
247. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1138 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1094 (1986).
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use of his or her identity. ' 248 It is transferable by license or assign-
ment,249 and in most states continues after death,210 except apparently
for Elvis.
A recent Ninth Circuit case points out the possible applications of
this right to computer-generated works. In Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. ,2S1
a performer, Tom Waits, sued Frito-Lay for performing a song in his
unique style .5 2 Mr. Waits has a gravel-rich voice that is immediately
recognizable to those who know his work. For this reason, he has
been highly sought after for commercial endorsements, although he
has always refused. Frito-Lay decided to do a "sound-alike" record-
ing for its ad campaign. 2 3 The singer Frito-Lay hired sounded just
like Waits. The court awarded Waits $2.5 million because it found that
his right to control his image belongs to him.254 The commercial was
not an infringement of any of his copyrights, yet the court allowed
Waits to collect. The court's award bears resemblance to the moral
right to integrity.5
In a similar vein, French has "hired" a computer to write a book
that is a "read-alike" to Susann's works. The book was based on two
of Susann's works, just as the Frito-Lay song was based on Waits's
previous works. The commercial capitalized on the recognizability of
Waits's sound, just as French intends to capitalize on the recognizabil-
ity of Susann's name and style. Under this theory, the Susann estate
might have collected if it had chosen to sue French.
There are shortcomings to using the right of publicity to solve this
issue. If the AI programmer wants to capitalize on a celebrity writer's
name, the programmer will have to pay for it. If the AI programmer
wants to capitalize on the writer's talent, without revealing the name,
the offended writer may never "know what hit him." Perhaps this is
where the line should be drawn. Since it will be difficult to determine
what writers were used to create a given AI-generated work, legal ec-
onomics may dictate that such cases cannot be tried. Litigation may
only be practical when the author's name is used for publicity. This
248. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216
(1954).
249. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, Ti RmGrs OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 10.3-A
(1992).
250. Id. § 9.5.
251. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
252. Id. at 1096.
253. Id. at 1097.
254. Ld. at 1103.
255. See supra part V.
[Vol. 28:401
"READ-ALIKE" WORKS
makes for a tidy package and may ultimately be the most reasonable
solution.
VII. CONCLUSION
She looked up at him. He liked that look. It was her
beauty that made him feel like a man. He felt the warmth
from the liquor. He needed it. He needed courage to be with
her.
The phone call had saved him. He wasn't ready. He
couldn't tell her. Not after the bulls. He watched the fax
machine as it spit out page after page. It reminded him of the
big gun. The one they placed high on the hill.
She was sad. She knew that he wasn't the man he once
was. Not the original. An imitation. Like the original, but
somehow not quite the same. "How could someone change
him," she thought. He was Rick. Or was it Nick. She
couldn't remember anymore. Nothing seemed the same.
It was all fading-like some elusive dream. She wanted
things to be the way they were, but she knew he was dead.
Dead inside.
A human author can try to write like Hemingway. In fact, many
do." 6 They read Hemingway's words and feel the emotion that he
meant to invoke. They take this feeling and try to interpret it into
their own creation. It is a uniquely human process of interpretation
and creation.
French has taken Susann's words and interpreted them into his
own creation. But he hasn't used his own human abilities. Instead, he
used an artificial device to accomplish his task in digital rather than
analog terms.
The question we have tried to answer is whether or not there is
any difference between what French did and what any "Hemingway
pretender" has done. Conventional infringement protection doesn't
adequately deal with these issues. The current definition of infringe-
ment focuses on the work, not the way in which it was prepared.
There are legal and philosophical ramifications to calling an AI a
person. It is what is missing in an AI that makes it different from a
human. The missing quality is an intangible and somewhat difficult to
256. Jack Smith, What Fun to Make Mockery of Hemingway Masterpieces, L.A. TiMES,
Mar. 16, 1992, at El.
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grasp. We cannot define these missing elements, but merely lay out
the possible parameters within which they may be found.
If the computer is missing something in its interpretation of
human-authored works, then there muist be some new standard with
which to judge the nature of computer-generated works. A possibility
for this standard is to vary the definition of a derivative work. A com-
pulsory license scheme may be the most legally efficient means to
compensate authors for the products of their computer counterparts.
Although the focus of copyright law is monetary compensation,
there are other considerations. An artist creates for a number of rea-
sons. If the theory is accepted that what an author creates is forever a
part of their being, then the author should have certain inalienable
rights in this creation. If a computer cannot possess the human quali-
ties of intentionality and free will, then it is usurping these human
qualities when it "copies" them. Adopting a system of moral rights to
protect the works of authors against unintended exploitation is a logi-
cal means of recognizing the importance of the author's integrity in
her work.
In addition to maintaining the integrity of her work, an author's
name has value apart from the work. Although it is difficult to put a
price on the so-called celebrity status, many courts have attempted to
do so. If no cohesive theory can be developed to protect an author's
work from duplication in "read-alike" form, at the very least, an au-
thor should be able to invoke a right of publicity to garner protection.
Currently there is only one known computer-generated work
based on an existing author's works. But technology is increasing at
exponential rates. With the proposed information "superhighway," 7
these issues will occur with increasing frequency." s Information is
traded back and forth at the speed of light. Each piece of this infor-
mation has an author, and each one of these authors deserves credit
for their unique contributions.
The act of creation is an arduous process. It takes a vision, persis-
tence, and usually a tremendous amount of hard work. Once the
work is completed, there are no guarantees that it will be well-re-
ceived. The artist puts something of herself on the line. The com-
puter programmer may also work hard, have a vision, and certainly
257. "Information Super-Highway" Barrels Down on Consumers, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONI-
TOR, Dec. 31, 1993, at 14.
258. See generally James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens,
Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (1992) (proposing various legal is-
sues that arise as technology increases).
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must be persistent. But the programmer does not put her own integ-
rity on the line, but rather borrows the integrity of others. If intellec-
tual property law will not protect authors, then some other scheme
must be enacted to allow them to maintain control of that which
makes them human.
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